On Three Attempts to Rebut the Evans Argument against Indeterminate Identity by Radim Bělohrad
137
Croatian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. XIX, No. 55, 2019
On Three Attempts to Rebut 
the Evans Argument against 
Indeterminate Identity
RADIM BĚLOHRAD
Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic
The goal of this paper is to assess three arguments that have been pro-
posed to rebut the idea that the notion of indeterminate identity is in-
coherent. In the fi rst part, the author presents Gareth Evans’ argument 
purporting to show the incoherence of indeterminate identity. Next, the 
author assesses a rebuttal proposed by E. J. Lowe. Although the rebuttal 
seems sound, Harold Noonan has shown that its scope is limited. After 
that, a rebuttal by Peter van Inwagen is analysed. The author compares 
it with Lowe’s and shows that consistent application of the principles 
van Inwagen uses leads to objects having inconsistent properties. In the 
fi nal part, it is shown that although the answer proposed by Terence 
Parsons seems superior to both van Inwagen’s and Lowe’s, its scope is 
also limited. As a result, Evans’ argument seems to stand unrefuted by 
these three counterarguments. 
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1.
Is indeterminacy solely a feature of language, or also a feature of real-
ity? Several decades ago a similar question was asked about modality. 
Are necessity and contingency merely properties of sentences, or are 
they also properties of facts? The prevailing view then was that the 
world has no modal features. These were thought to be characteristic 
of our descriptions of the world. But through the work of a number 
of philosophers the concept of modality de re has become a respect-
able part of metaphysics (see van Inwagen 1990: 283). More recently, a 
similar question has been asked about indeterminacy, with the default 
view that there is nothing indeterminate about reality; all indetermi-
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nacy inheres in our concepts’ having insuffi ciently delineated mean-
ings and extensions. However, a number of philosophers have recently 
defended the view that indeterminacy is a feature of the world.1 There 
are debates about what exactly this view entails. Some philosophers 
believe that anyone who accepts that indeterminacy is a feature of the 
world is committed to the view that sometimes it may be indeterminate 
whether an object x is identical with an object y. That is, some claim 
that the proponent of metaphysical indeterminacy is committed to in-
determinate identity.
On Parsons’ defi nition of indeterminate identity, it is indeterminate 
whether x is identical with y if and only if
there is no property that x determinately possesses that y determinately 
does not possess, and vice versa, but there is at least one property that x de-
terminately possesses such that it is indeterminate whether y possesses it, 
or vice versa, or at least one property that x determinately does not possess 
such that it is indeterminate whether y possesses it, or vice versa. (Parsons 
2000: 31)
To get a clearer idea of what indeterminate identity might mean in 
reality, consider the following scenario, which employs the idea of inde-
terminate diachronic identity:
You own a motorcycle—Cyclone. One day you decide to give it a bit of a face-
lift, and disassemble it down to the smallest parts. Due to a lack of time, you 
leave it disassembled on your garage fl oor for two years. When you return 
to your project, you fi nd that a number of the parts have been damaged by 
rust beyond repair. You decide to invest in new parts and end up replacing 
about half of the components. In the end, you decide to give the motorcycle 
a brand-new fi nish—you paint it black. Since the new motorcycle now looks 
markedly different from the original one, you decide to conclude the grand 
renovation by renaming it Hurricane.
Is Hurricane the same motorcycle as Cyclone? There are reasons we 
can cite in favour of the identity, such as the sameness of half of the 
original parts, and there are reasons against the identifi cation, such 
as the complete disassembly and replacement of half of the parts.2 As 
a result, it seems the question has no answer. The identity of Cyclone 
and Hurricane is, in other words, indeterminate.
To illustrate how the example fi ts Parsons’ defi nition of indetermi-
nate identity, take Hurricane’s property of being black. It is now the 
case that one of the objects determinately has a property, while it is 
indeterminate whether the other object has it. Hurricane is determi-
nately black, but it is indeterminate whether Cyclone is black. Or sup-
pose you bought the motorcycle in 2010. It is then determinately true 
that you bought Cyclone in 2010, but it is indeterminate whether you 
1 See, for instance, Baker (2007), Parsons (2000), van Inwagen (1995) and 
Williams (2008).
2 Although I speak of parts here, the force of the example does not depend on any 
mereological claims. The point is that since the motorcycles differ in parts, they will 
clearly differ in properties, which are my main focus here.
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bought Hurricane in 2010. If Cyclone and Hurricane do not determi-
nately differ with respect to some properties, and let us now assume 
they do not, then it is indeterminate whether they are identical.
Proponents of the linguistic account of indeterminacy will say that 
the indeterminate status of the identity statement in question is com-
pletely due to the fact that the expressions in the statement have not 
been defi ned precisely. We could, if we wished to, stipulate that the 
name Cyclone only applies to the original motorcycle as long as the 
engine, or another part for that matter, has been retained. Or we could 
say that the name will apply to the object as long as at least half of 
the parts remain the same. On any of these precisifi cations it would 
either be true or false that Cyclone is identical to Hurricane, but since 
we have not determined the precise meanings of the expressions, the 
identity question cannot be given a determinate answer.
Proponents of the metaphysical account of indeterminacy will 
claim, in contrast, that the indeterminacy of the identity claim is due 
to the fact that the facts in the world do not determine the identity 
claim either way. They do not deny that vagueness is also a feature of 
language, but maintain that even if we sharpened all the expressions 
of our language, some questions about facts could still not be given a 
determinate answer. In particular, there might still be objects of which 
it is true to say that it is indeterminate whether they are identical, 
regardless of the way we describe them.
The notion of metaphysically indeterminate identity has struck 
many people as suspicious. Notably, Gareth Evans argued in an infl u-
ential paper that it is downright incoherent (Evans 1978). He showed 
that if we assume that objects are indeterminately identical, a valid 
argument can be constructed to show that the objects are, in fact, dis-





(5) ¬(a=b) (Evans 1978: 208)3
Premise (1) is the hypothesis of indeterminate identity and states that 
it is indeterminate whether a is identical to b. (2) follows by property 
abstraction from (1) and states that b has the property of being such 
that it is indeterminate whether it is identical to a. The idea is that if it 
is true that it is indeterminate whether a is identical to b, then b must 
possess a certain property, namely, the property of being such that it 
is indeterminate whether it is identical to a. (3) is a generally accepted 
truism—it is not the case that it is indeterminate whether a is identi-
3 This paraphrase of the Evans argument differs from the original by using the λ 
notation to express property abstracts where the original uses circumfl exed variables. 
‘λx[(x=a)]b’ reads ‘b has the property of being such that it is indeterminate that it is 
identical to a’. ‘’ is the indeterminacy operator and reads ‘it is indeterminate that’.
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cal to a. But then it is not the case that a has the property of being 
such that it is indeterminate whether it is identical to a, as (4) states. 
Clearly, then, according to (2) and (4), b and a differ with respect to 
a property. By the contrapositive of Leibniz’s Law, if objects differ in 
properties, they must be different. From this it follows that (5)—it is 
not the case that a is identical to b. As a result, any claim as to the in-
determinacy of identity of objects leads to the claim that the objects are 
actually different. The concept of indeterminate identity is incoherent.
The proof has generated extensive discussion. Below, I will focus on 
answers by three philosophers and assess their merits.
2.
In a brief paper, E. J. Lowe (Lowe 1994) suggests a rebuttal to Evans’ 
argument based on the idea that one cannot legitimately infer from 
the claim that it is not indeterminate that a is identical to a the claim 
that a does not have the property of being such that it is indeterminate 
whether it is identical to a, because this property is not determinately 
distinct from the property, which a possesses, of being such that it is 
indeterminate whether it is identical to b. Let us look at the details.
Lowe claims that if, according to (2), b has the property of being 
such that it is indeterminate whether it is identical to a, then a must 
have the symmetrical property of being such that it is indeterminate 
whether it is identical to b. But since these two properties only differ 
by the permutation of ‘a’ and ‘b’ they cannot be determinately distinct, 
for a and b are not determinately distinct. But then the claim made in 
(4) cannot be true: it cannot be true that a does not have the property 
of being such that it is indeterminate whether it is identical to a (Lowe 
1994: 113–114). It is indeterminate that this property is identical to the 
property of being such that it is indeterminate whether it is identical to 
b, and a does have this latter property. So, at best, it must be the case 
that it is indeterminate that a does not have the property of being such 
that it is indeterminate whether it is identical to a. But in that case the 
argument fails to locate a defi nite difference in the properties of a and b 
and cannot lead to conclusion (5) by the contrapositive of Leibniz’s Law.
This is an ingenious rebuttal of the Evans argument, but it has been 
shown that it does not cut deep enough.
3.
In his response (Noonan 2003), Harold Noonan claimed that Lowe’s 
rebuttal only works for identity-involving properties, such as the ones 
in the original statement of Evans’ argument. However, he maintains 
that the argument can be formulated so as to involve other proper-
ties and that in such cases the rebuttal is ineffective: ‘… what Lowe 
is assuming is that the Evansian pattern of argument against vague 
identity in the world essentially requires appeal to properties only ex-
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pressible using the concept of identity. But this is incorrect’ (Noonan 
2003: 115–116).
I will not paraphrase Noonan’s own examples but will instead il-
lustrate his reasoning by applying it to the Cyclone–Hurricane sce-
nario. Consider the predicate ‘black’. The predicate is true of Hurri-
cane, so it is not indeterminate whether Hurricane is black. But it is 
indeterminate whether Cyclone is black. So, Hurricane does not have 
the property of being such that it is indeterminate whether it is black, 
but Cyclone does have that property. By the contrapositive of Leibniz’s 
Law, Cyclone and Hurricane must be different. Put formally, where 









It is hard to see how one could utilize Lowe’s strategy here. This strat-
egy is based on the claim that a and b only ‘differ’ in identity-involving 
properties that are indeterminately distinct, so a and b cannot differ 
determinately. But what properties in this version of the argument 
could be the candidates for the indeterminately distinct properties? 
There is only the property of being black, and that property does not 
make any reference to either Cyclone or Hurricane, so the indetermi-
nacy of their identity cannot do the work it does in the above identity-
involving properties. In other words, one could not deny premise (4*), 
which states that Hurricane does not have the property of being such 
that it is indeterminate whether it is black, on the grounds that this 
property is indeterminately identical with some property that Hurri-
cane does have. What property would that be?
I fi nd Noonan’s argument quite convincing. That is, if we accept 
that there is such a property as the property of being such that it is in-
determinate whether it is black, Cyclone and Hurricane determinately 
differ in possession of this property and must, as a result, be different 
objects.
Let us now turn to van Inwagen’s solution, compare it with Lowe’s 
and see whether it constitutes an improvement.
4.
It should be noted at the outset that van Inwagen would not accept 
the Cyclone–Hurricane example as one of indeterminate identity. Van 
Inwagen’s ontology only contains two kinds of objects—simples and 
organisms (see van Inwagen 1995). Motorcycles are mere simples ar-
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ranged motorcyclewise, and, thus, the question of ‘their’ identity never 
arises. But van Inwagen’s strategy for dealing with Evans’ argument 
is quite independent of the reasons for his ontological asceticism, so we 
may ignore this detail.
The central idea of van Inwagen’s response to Evans’ argument is 
that if objects are indeterminately identical and one of them possesses 
a certain property, then the other must possess that property at least 
indeterminately (see van Inwagen 1995: 253). But if that is the case, 
we will not be able to fi nd a determinate difference between them and, 
thus, reach the conclusion of Evans’ argument. Let us now look at the 
details.
Van Inwagen develops a semantics for the language of fi rst-order 
logic including identity, property abstraction and the sentence opera-
tor ‘indef’ which abbreviates ‘it is neither defi nitely true nor defi nitely 
false that’ (van Inwagen 1995: 246). His aim is to show that the use of 
property abstraction in Evans’ argument can reasonably be considered 
invalid (van Inwagen 1995: 246). The semantics utilizes three truth 
values: 1, 0, and ½. Van Inwagen shows that a model can be found in 
which the step from premise (3) to premise (4) does not preserve defi -
nite truth, because it leads from a claim with truth value 1 to a claim 
with truth value ½, thus making the argument invalid.
It will not be necessary to reconstruct the whole semantical frag-
ment that van Inwagen develops. It is only important to realize why 
the inference from (3) to (4) is invalid. Let us, fi rst, restate the inference 
slightly more succinctly. In this section, I will use van Inwagen’s opera-
tor ‘indef’ instead of ‘’.4
The crucial inference can now be restated as follows:
  indef (a=a) □λx[indef (a=x)]a
I will now paraphrase those components of the semantics that will en-
able us to evaluate this inference.
1. A universe U is a non-empty set of objects.
2. A pairing on a universe is a (possibly empty) set of two-membered 
  sets (pairs) of members of that universe.
3. Objects are paired iff it is indefi nite whether they are identical.
4. If a constant ‘a’ refers to object A and if A is paired with B, then 
  B is the fringe referent of ‘a’.
5. The extension of an identity predicate contains just the referent 
4 While writing this paper, I had to make a decision about what notation and 
terminology I would use to speak about the various theories, because they differ in 
these respects. Van Inwagen uses ‘indefi nitely’ where others use ‘indeterminately’. I 
generally use ‘indeterminately’ throughout this text, and only when I directly refer 
to van Inwagen’s defi nitions and notation do I respect his term ‘indefi nitely’ and the 
operator ‘indef ’. Also, like Evans, van Inwagen uses circumfl exed variables where 
others use the λ notation to express property abstracts. I adopt the latter alternative. 
Finally, van Inwagen deviates from the original statement of the Evans argument by 
permuting ‘a’ and ‘b’. I do not adopt this strategy and paraphrase Inwagen’s rebuttal 
to fi t the original statement of the Evans argument.
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  of its term; the frontier of an identity predicate contains just the 
  fringe referents of its term.
6. The result of prefi xing ‘’ to a predicate having extension e and 
  frontier f is a predicate having extension U-(ef) and frontier f.
7. The result of prefi xing ‘indef’ to a predicate having frontier f is 
  a predicate having extension f and an empty frontier.
8. The extension and frontier of an abstract are the extension and 
  frontier of the predicate on which it is formed.
9. An identity sentence is:
  a. true iff something is the referent of both terms;
  b. ½ iff nothing is the referent of both its terms and the referents 
   of its terms are paired.
10. An ascription sentence (that is, a sentence in which a property 
  is ascribed to an object) is
  a. true iff the referent of its subject belongs to the extension of 
   its abstract;
  b. ½ iff the referent of its subject does not belong to the extensi-
   on of its abstract, and either (a) the referent of its subject 
   belongs to the frontier of its abstract, or (b) a fringe referent 
   of its subject belongs either to the extension or to the frontier 
   of its abstract;
  c. false iff neither the referent nor a fringe referent of its subject 
   belongs either to the extension or to the frontier of its ab-
   stract.
11. If ‘φ’ is true, then ‘indef φ’ is false; if ‘φ’ is ½, then ‘indef φ’ is 
  true; if ‘φ’ is false, then ‘indef φ’ is false.
12. If ‘φ’ is true, then ‘φ’ is false; if ‘φ’ is ½, then ‘φ’ is ½; if ‘φ’ is 
  false, then ‘φ’ is true.
13. A valid inference form is truth-preserving and does not lead 
  from the value ½ to false. (van Inwagen 1995: 249–251)
Van Inwagen then considers the following model:
{A, B}, {{A, B}}, ‘a’ ref A, ‘b’ ref B
On this model, the universe contains only two objects, A and B; these 
objects are paired, that is, indefi nitely identical; and A is the referent 
of ‘a’ and B is the referent of ‘b’.
The left-hand side of the inference consists of the negation of an 
indeterminate identity sentence. The embedded sentence ‘(a=a)’ meets 
condition 9, because the referent of both terms is A, and, therefore, 
is true. According to 11, ‘indef (a=a)’ is false. According to 12, ‘indef 
(a=a)’ is true. This is just what we would intuitively expect: it is not 
true that the identity of a to a is indefi nite.
The right-hand side is the negation of a sentence which ascribes the 
property of being such that it is indeterminate whether something is 
identical to a to the referent of ‘a’. Again, intuitively and in accordance 
with Evans’ reasoning we would judge that this sentence is true: object 
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A does not have the property of being such that it is indeterminate 
whether it is identical to A. But on the above model the value of this 
sentence comes out as ½. Let us look at the individual evaluation steps.
At the core of the sentence is an identity predicate ‘(a=x)’. According 
to 5, the extension of the predicate contains the referent of a, that is, 
the object A, and the frontier contains the only fringe referent of a, that 
is, object B. Next, according to 7, the extension of the predicate ‘indef 
(a=x)’ is the same as the frontier of the predicate ‘(a=x)’, that is, object 
B, and its frontier is empty. The extension and frontier of the abstract 
‘λx[indef (a=x)]’ are the same as those of the predicate ‘indef (a=x)’, ac-
cording to 8. Importantly, according to 10, the value of the ascription 
sentence ‘λx[indef (a=x)]a’ will be ½: the referent of the subject a, that 
is, object A, does not belong to the extension of ‘λx[indef (a=x)]’—we 
have just seen that that extension contains object B. But a fringe ref-
erent of a, that is, object B, belongs to the extension of the abstract. 
According to 10b, this gives the ascription sentence the value of ½. 
Finally, the negation of a sentence with the value of ½ has, according 
to 12, the value of ½. Thus, the value of the complete sentence on the 
right-hand side of the inference is ½. The inference step from premise 
(3) of the Evans argument to premise (4) does not preserve truth, be-
cause it leads from a true sentence to a sentence with the value of ½. 
That means, according to 13, that the inference is invalid.
The above reasoning can be put less formally as follows. Suppose 
that we are not dealing with an object indefi nitely identical to another 
object, but with a regular object the identity of which is defi nite. Call 
the object C. In such a case, it is quite obvious that C is defi nitely iden-
tical to C, that it has the property of being defi nitely identical to C, and, 
as a result, that it does not have the property of being indefi nitely iden-
tical to C. But here we are not dealing with such regular objects. We 
are dealing with objects A and B which are indefi nitely identical. And 
the key intuition is that if one of them has a certain property, the other 
one must ‘sort of ’ have it too’ (van Inwagen 1995: 255).5 So if B has the 
property of being such that it is indeterminate whether it is identical to 
A, then because it is indeterminate whether B=A, A must also ‘sort of’ 
have the property of being such that it is indeterminate whether it is 
identical to A. And this ‘sort of’ status is formally expressed by the fact 
that the sentence which ascribes to A the property of being such that it 
is indeterminate whether it is identical to A has the value of ½ and its 
negation as well.
Van Inwagen illustrates this reasoning by examples involving em-
pirical properties. In one of them, he describes the Cabinet, an infernal 
philosophical engine which can disrupt the life of anyone who enters in 
such a way that it is indefi nite whether the person who later emerges 
from it is the same person as the person who entered. The person who 
5  This does not preclude the possibility that A and B fully share some of their 
properties.
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entered is called Alpha, the person who emerged is called Omega. Since 
we do not know whether Alpha survived the changes in the Cabinet, it 
is indefi nite whether Omega is identical to Alpha (van Inwagen 1995: 
241–242). Suppose further that Omega is hanged when he emerges 
from the Cabinet. Van Inwagen comments: ‘it is quite defi nitely true 
of Omega that he dies by hanging. Could it be defi nitely false of Alpha 
that he dies by hanging? It is hard to see how this could be, given that 
it is not defi nitely false that Alpha is numerically distinct from Omega’ 
(van Inwagen 1995: 253).
Or consider again our Cyclone–Hurricane example. You have paint-
ed the motorcycle black. As a result, it is defi nitely true of Hurricane 
now that it is black. Could it be defi nitely false of Cyclone that it is 
black? Again, it is hard to see how it could, given that it is not defi nitely 
false that Cyclone is numerically distinct from Hurricane.
Van Inwagen then concludes: ‘Should matters be different if [the 
property abstract] contains the symbols “=” and “indef”? I do not see 
why they should’ (van Inwagen 1995: 254). In other words, even if the 
property in question is, say, the property of being such that it is indefi -
nite whether it is identical to a, the above reasoning still holds. If B has 
this property, then A must have it indefi nitely, because it is indefi nite 
whether it is identical to B. As a result, it is indefi nite whether A has 
the property of being indefi nitely identical to A.
In what follows, I will fi rst compare van Inwagen’s strategy with 
Lowe’s, and then express concerns about its effectiveness. I will show 
that the consistent application of one of van Inwagen’s key principles 
leads to objects having inconsistent properties.
5.
There is an interesting parallel between Lowe’s and van Inwagen’s ap-
proaches. Both of them attack the inference from (3) to (4). Both argue 
that from the fact that it is not indeterminate whether a is identical 
to a, one cannot infer that a does not have the property of being such 
that it is indeterminate whether it is identical to a. But they do it for 
slightly different reasons. Lowe bases his strategy on considerations 
related to the identity of properties, which is something van Inwagen 
does not consider. For Lowe, the property of being such that it is inde-
terminate whether it is identical to a is not determinately distinct from 
the property of being such that it is indeterminate whether it is identi-
cal to b. But since object A has this latter property, it cannot be claimed 
that it determinately does not have the former property. At best it can 
be claimed that it is not determinate that it does not possess it. But, to 
repeat, the reason inheres in the fact that the two properties are not 
determinately distinct.
Van Inwagen seems to suppose that we can reach the same con-
clusion from the mere fact that the objects that allegedly have those 
properties are not determinately distinct. He states that ‘if a constant k 
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defi nitely denotes something x, and there is a y such that it is indefi nite 
whether x=y, and y defi nitely has the property denoted by the abstract 
F, then ˹k has F˺ should receive a value of at least ½’ (van Inwagen 
1995: 254). As a result, if b defi nitely has the property of being such 
that it is indefi nite whether it is identical to a, then since it is indefi nite 
whether b=a, the sentence ‘a has the property of being such that it is 
indefi nite whether it is identical to a’ must receive a value of at least ½. 
That is why it cannot be true that a does not have the property of being 
such that it is indefi nite whether it is identical to a.
There is one seeming advantage to van Inwagen’s approach. We 
have seen that Lowe’s reasoning fails if we formulate the Evans argu-
ment using properties not involving identity, for then he loses ground 
for his claim that the properties in the original Evans argument are in-
determinately identical, because they only differ by the permutation of 
their constants. Nothing in van Inwagen’s approach suggests, however, 
that his reasoning would be limited to identity-involving properties. 
After all, the above principle applies to properties generally. This opens 
the possibility of refuting even those versions of the Evans argument 
that involve regular properties, such as being black. I will attempt to 
show, however, that there are unwelcome consequences.
6.
Consider again the fact that Hurricane is black. There is nothing inde-
terminate about this fact. It is just there, standing in front of you, black. 
Now take van Inwagen’s principle that if it is indeterminate whether a 
is identical to b and a determinately possesses a certain property, then 
b must possess that property at least indeterminately. As a result, Cy-
clone has (at least) indeterminately the property of being black. That 
makes sense, because if the motorbike standing in front of me is deter-
minately Hurricane and indeterminately Cyclone, and if Hurricane is 
determinately black, then Cyclone must be indeterminately black.
But notice that van Inwagen’s principle is a general one and noth-
ing prevents us from using it to reason back from Cyclone to Hurricane. 
We have now concluded that Cyclone is indeterminately black, that is, 
that Cyclone has the property of being such that it is indeterminate 
whether it is black. But Cyclone is indeterminately identical to Hur-
ricane and, according to van Inwagen’s principle, any property it has 
will be such that Hurricane will have it at least indeterminately. So 
if Cyclone is indeterminately black, it must be true of Hurricane that 
it is indeterminate that it is indeterminately black. But this is clearly 
inconsistent with the fact that Hurricane is, right there in front of me, 
black. How could an object determinately be black and at the same 
time be such that is indeterminate whether it is indeterminately black?
To see the problem even more clearly, consider van Inwagen’s own 
example with the Cabinet. Alpha enters the Cabinet. The Cabinet 
causes changes to Alpha resulting in its being indeterminate whether 
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Alpha has survived. Then someone, Omega, emerges from the Cabinet 
and we immediately hang him. Omega is clearly dead. This is as de-
terminate as anything can be. But it is indeterminate whether Omega 
is Alpha, so, by van Inwagen’s principle, it is indeterminate whether 
Alpha is dead. Good. But if it is indeterminate whether Alpha is dead, 
by the same principle it must be the case that it is indeterminate that 
it is indeterminate that Omega is dead. And I do not see how that could 
be if it is quite clear that Omega is dead.
Or consider that you behead Omega. There he lies, his head sepa-
rated from his body. Obviously, he is dead and determinately so. Sup-
pose someone doubts: ‘Well, I am not saying that it is indeterminate 
that Omega is dead; that is clearly not the case. But what I am saying 
is that the indeterminacy of Omega’s death is indeterminate.’ What 
would that mean? That would mean that perhaps it is indeterminate 
that Omega is dead, but perhaps it is not indeterminate, and, as a 
result, Omega is either determinately dead or determinately alive. I 
think that, looking at the head lying 3 feet away from the body, these 
speculations cannot be taken seriously.
To drive the point home, consider an analogy with epistemic cer-
tainty. If something is determinately the case, it is certain that it is the 
case. If something is indeterminately the case, it is uncertain whether 
it is the case. Suppose we say that it is certain that Omega is dead and 
then add that it is uncertain that it is uncertain that Omega is dead. 
That is a paradox. Of course, it would be a more blatant paradox if 
we only added that it is uncertain that Omega is dead. But even if we 
weaken the uncertainty of Omega’s death by declaring even that fact 
uncertain, there still remains a grain of uncertainty, which is inconsis-
tent with what we see outside the Cabinet. Uncertainty about uncer-
tainty does not make a certainty.
The advantage of considering the argument with empirical proper-
ties is that it shows us clearly that there is an inconsistency in van 
Inwagen’s rebuttal, something which is less clear when we ponder over 
the cases with identity-involving properties. In the identity-involving 
cases we rely on our intuitive a priori judgments about the concept of 
identity. In the empirical-property-involving cases we rely on the evi-
dence of our senses. If someone wants to claim that it is indeterminate 
that Omega is indeterminately dead, I just point to the corpse. But, 
ultimately, the fate of these cases must be the same. You are looking at 
Hurricane. It is there and it is defi nitely identical with Hurricane. How 
could it at the same time be indeterminate that it is indeterminately 
identical with Hurricane?
7.
Could my reasoning be blocked? Could I have taken an illegitimate 
step? The reasoning consists in two steps. First, I have reasoned from 
an object defi nitely having a property to an object (indefi nitely identi-
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cal to the former object) having the property indeterminately. Second, 
I have reasoned back from this latter object’s having the property inde-
terminately to the former object indeterminately having this property 
indeterminately.
Perhaps I have not paid careful attention to van Inwagen’s formu-
lation of the key principle. He states that ‘if a constant k defi nitely 
denotes something x, and there is a y such that it is indefi nite whether 
x=y, and y defi nitely has the property denoted by the abstract F, then 
˹k has F˺ should receive a value of at least ½’ (van Inwagen 1995: 254). 
The relevant condition is ‘y defi nitely has the property denoted by the 
abstract F’. The principle says nothing about the situation when it is 
indefi nite whether an object has the property denoted by the abstract 
F. So perhaps we are not allowed to reason back from Cyclone to Hur-
ricane and from Alpha to Omega, because neither Cyclone nor Alpha 
has the relevant property defi nitely. It is indefi nite whether they have 
them, and the principle does not warrant reasoning back to Hurri-
cane’s or Alpha’s having that relevant property with a further degree 
of indefi niteness.
But this sort of reply would seem ad hoc to me. By accepting the 
validity of the inference from (1) to (2), van Inwagen accepts that the 
fact that it is indefi nite whether a is identical to b (a claim about the 
indefi niteness of a certain state of affairs) entails that b defi nitely has a 
certain property, namely that of being such that it is indefi nite whether 
it is identical to a (a claim about an object having a certain property). 
Similarly, I do not see why we could not claim that, since it is indefi nite 
whether Cyclone has the property of being black (a claim about the in-
defi niteness of a certain state of affairs), then Cyclone defi nitely has a 
property of being such that it is indefi nite whether it has the property of 
being black (a claim about Cyclone’s property). Blocking this inference 
while retaining the inference from (1) to (2) seems unjustifi ed. But if we 
accept the inference, then we have to accept that Cyclone defi nitely has 
the above property, and we may apply van Inwagen’s principle again 
to reason back to Hurricane having that property indefi nitely. Finally, 
we reach the property of being such that it is indefi nite whether it is 
indefi nite whether it is black, which, I claim, is inconsistent with the 
property of being black.
I conclude that iterating the application of van Inwagen’s principle 
leads to the objects’ having inconsistent properties. As a result, van 
Inwagen’s rebuttal of the Evans argument must be abandoned.
8.
We have seen that to avoid ending up with objects with inconsistent 
properties, the defender of van Inwagen’s strategy would have to block 
iterating the application of the crucial principle. That would mean al-
lowing that Cyclone has the property of being such that it is indeter-
minate whether it is black, but denying that we could reason back to 
Hurricane having the property of being such that it is indeterminate 
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whether it is indeterminate whether it is black. I have argued this re-
striction is unmotivated.
But a more sweeping strategy has been defended in the literature, 
which aims to strike the Evans argument at two points. The strategy 
is to show that the use of property abstracts throughout the argument 
is illegitimate. This amounts to showing that both the step from (1) to 
(2) and the step from (3) to (4) are invalid, because it is not legitimate 
to infer anything about an object’s properties from the indeterminacy 
of its identity. Such a solution has been defended by Terence Parsons 
(2000) and we will look at it now.
What the Evans argument assumes is that premise (1) reports a fact 
about b, namely the fact that it is indeterminate whether it is identical 
to a, and that we may express the fact explicitly in (2) by ascribing to b 
a property, namely the property of being such that it is indeterminate 
whether it is identical to a (Evans 1978: 208).
But this is not the only way one can look at the situation. The sen-
tence expressed in (1) could be true even if there were not a particular 
property that b has. (1) states that it is indeterminate whether a is 
identical to b. The reason this is true is not because b has the property 
of being such that it is indeterminately identical to a, and a has the 
property of being such that it is indeterminately identical to b. Rather, 
(1) is true by virtue of it not being determinate whether the properties 
that one of the objects determinately possesses are determinately pos-
sessed by the other, and the properties one of the objects determinately 
does not possess are determinately not possessed by the other. In other 
words, (1) is made true by the complex fact or state of affairs in which 
a and b occur, and it is not necessary to postulate further properties of 
the objects to make (1) true. The fact that it is indeterminate whether 
a and b are identical is, in short, fully reducible to the fi rst-order prop-
erties of a and b and the ways in which a and b exemplify them, and no 
further properties need be postulated to explain the fact.
Parsons’ rebuttal is based on the denial of the principle that for ev-
ery predicate there is a property the predicate expresses. This is a con-
troversial point, but Parsons argues that it is reasonable to abandon 
the principle in indeterminacy contexts. Before I elaborate, I should 
mention that Noonan, who endorses the Evans argument, is well aware 
of an answer along these lines, but challenges it. He admits that in 
some contexts, such as intensional contexts, predicates do not neces-
sarily express properties. He considers the predicate ‘John believes x to 
be identical with Tully’: ‘… if John believes Tully to be identical with 
Tully, but does not believe Cicero to be identical with Tully, it does not 
follow that Tully and Cicero differ in their properties’ (Noonan 2003: 
144). The reason for this is that the difference only lies in the different 
ways that the objects are represented. But, Noonan claims, friends of 
indeterminate identity want to say that the identity between a and b 
is indeterminate due to how a and b are in fact, not just due to the way 
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we may represent them (Noonan 2003: 144). In other words, it is easy 
to understand why the fact that someone believes something about an 
object does not constitute the object’s having a property. But it is not so 
easy to understand how the fact that object b is indeterminately identi-
cal to object a does not constitute a property of b when at the same time 
it is assumed that the indeterminacy is de re and not just in the way we 
represent the objects.
But Parsons does offer a reason that is independent of the above 
considerations. The reason can be most clearly seen when we unpack 
the concept of identity by means of equivalence of property exemplifi ca-
tion (Parsons 2000: 50). The sentence
(a=b)
can be expressed as
(P) (PaPb),




The question of whether there is a property of ‘being such that it is 
indeterminate whether it is identical to a’ then turns into the question 
of whether the following abstract represents a property:
λx[(P) (PaPx)]
The abstract reads ‘the property of being such that it is indeterminate 
whether it has exactly the same properties as a’. The problem with 
this abstract is, according to Parsons, that it ‘must “quantify into” 
an indeterminacy connective; the abstraction operator on the outside 
must bind a variable within the scope of the indeterminacy connective’ 
(Parsons 2000: 50). This leads to a problem ‘closely associated with the 
paradoxes of naïve set theory’ (Parsons 2000: 50).
In other words, the phrase ‘exactly the same properties as a’ actu-
ally refers to all properties of b including the property expressed by the 
complete abstract: ‘… the abstract stands for a property that is in the 
range of its own property variable’ (Parsons 2000: 51).
According to Parsons, this self-referential aspect of the abstract is a 
good reason why we should be sceptical whether it actually expresses a 
property that enters the defi nition of identity.
This is an ingenious response to the Evans argument. But it seems 
clear to me that, ultimately, its fate is the same as that of Lowe’s argu-
ment. Perhaps Parsons is right that the predicate ‘being such that it is 
indeterminate whether it is identical to a’ does not express a property, 
but we have seen that the Evans argument can be formulated without 
any reference to identity-involving properties. And it is also clear that 
Parsons cannot make use of his argument against the existence of iden-
tity-involving indeterminate properties to argue about other properties 
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that may fi gure in the Evans argument.
Let us return to the argument we formulated in part 3, where ‘P’ 









Adopting Parsons’ strategy, we might want to question whether the 
steps from (3*) to (4*) and from (5*) to (6*) are legitimate. We might ob-
ject that there is no guarantee that the predicates expressed in (3*) and 
(5*) express genuine properties, as suggested by the property abstracts 
in (4*) and (6*). But how could we justify the claim now? In the original 
formulation of the argument we could unpack the property of identity 
in terms of the equivalence of property exemplifi cation and show that 
the property of being such that it is indeterminate whether it is identi-
cal to a falls among the properties that the property actually quantifi es 
over. But in this formulation, there is no identity-involving property 
which could be unpacked. There is the property of being such that it is 
indeterminate whether it is black and the problem of ‘quantifying into’ 
does not occur. Since that was the primary reason why Parsons refused 
to accept the existence of the problematic properties and that reason 
does not apply here, we are left wondering why the inference should be 
illegitimate.
Conclusion
The Evans argument is based on the idea that the fact that it is inde-
terminate whether a and b are identical projects into their properties. 
While b has the property of being such that it is indeterminate whether 
it is identical to a, a lacks this property. Evans concludes that this makes 
a and b distinct. I have looked at three attempts to block this conclu-
sion. Lowe’s response was based on the claim that the identity-involv-
ing properties that the Evans argument employs do not make a and b 
determinately distinct. But, as Noonan has, in my opinion conclusively, 
shown, Lowe’s rebuttal is toothless when confronted with formulations 
of the Evans argument which do not employ identity-involving proper-
ties. Van Inwagen’s response is based on the idea that indeterminately 
distinct objects simply cannot differ determinately in the properties 
they exemplify. So even when b exemplifi es the property of being such 
that it is indeterminate whether it is identical to a, we must conclude 
that a has this property at least indeterminately, so it cannot be deter-
minately distinct from b. By using examples that, again, avoid refer-
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ence to identity, I have shown that this strategy leads to objects having 
inconsistent properties. Finally, Parsons’ rebuttal is based on the idea 
that the fact of indeterminate identity between a and b need not mean 
that they exemplify some further identity-involving properties and the 
idea that the property of being such that it is indeterminate whether it 
is identical to a is problematic due to self-reference. Even though this 
is an ingenious response, it is, again, toothless against formulations of 
the Evans argument that do not employ identity-involving properties, 
as I attempted to show in the fi nal part of this paper. Consequently, 
the three arguments I have considered do not threaten the Evans argu-
ment and, as a result, its central idea that the notion of indeterminate 
identity is incoherent, seems to stand unrefuted. None of the three at-
tempts to rebut the Evans argument have shown conclusively that the 
relation of indeterminate identity has any instances.6
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